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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IDA AND J AlVIES WILLIAMS,) 
Plaintiffs and Appellant) 
vs. , Case No. 8614 
I 
ZIONS COOPERATIVE ) 
::MERCANTILE INSTITUTION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Respondent joins with the Appellant 1n 
referring to the parties throughout as they appeared 
at the trial, i.e., the Respondent being the Defendant 
therein and the Appellant being the Plaintiff, Ida 
Williams only. Basically the Defendant joins in the 
statement of facts as found in Appellant's Brief 
with the observations and slight variations as shown 
herein. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as recited by the Plain-
tiff herein as to the date and place of the accident 
and as to the motion of the Defendant are all ac-
curately stated. Since the sole issue in this appeal 
is as to whether or not the Plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law, the fact as stated 
by the Plaintiff and with which the Defendant can-
not agree is recited as follows: 
''.After Plaintiff had started into the inter-
section, when her car was about 25 feet from the 
panel truck, it suddenly pulled out of the inter-
section.'' (R. 63, 65) 
The Plaintiff herself testified that from a point 
25 feet north of the intersection, she did not see nor 
look in the direction of the truck again until after 
the point of impact. (R. 50) The only witness to 
testify as to the position of the vehicles as they en-
tered the intersection was the passenger in the auto-
mobile of the Plaintiff, ~Irs. Singleton, who testified 
as follows: 
• · Q. 'Yhere were you in the intersection 
when you saw the truck start to pull out~ 
niH. COXDER: I think that would be im-
nwtt•rial as far as this witness is concerned. 
THE COURT: I will let her answer. 
A. \\~ (' hadn ~t got into it exactly.'~ (R. 63) 
HTATE:\IENT OF POINTS 
rrllE COlTHT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
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AS A MATTER OF LA-W THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AND 
THAT SUCH CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE ACCIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
RULING AS .. A. MATTER OF LAW THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS CONrr,RIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE ACCIDENT. 
We will concede that this court upon reviewing 
the evidence where there has been a directed verdict 
must review it in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff in determining whether the Court erred 
in taking the case from the Jury (See N ielse·n v. 
Mauchley, (1949) 115 Utah 86, 202 P. 2d 547). How-
ever, since the motion was made at the end of the 
Plaintiff's case, it will mean that this Court should 
consider the v1hole record on appeal. The evidence 
in this case is uncontradicted that the Defendant's 
truck was stopped at the stop sign on Third Avenue 
and facing east. (R. 50) The Plaintiff was traveling 
south on '' B '' Street. The Plaintiff was 25 feet 
north of the intersection when she saw the Defend-
ant's truck, (R. 50) and she assumed that the truck 
would wait for her to clear through the intersection. 
She thereafter traversed the 25 feet and the north 
one-half of the intersection before the impact and 
never again looked to see the truck until the n1oment 
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of impact. During all of this time she was travel-
ing only 20 miles per hour. It should be noted that 
she testified on direct examination that she was 
traveling 25 miles per hour (R. 16), however, on 
cross-examination she changed her speed to only 
20 miles per hour (R. 51). This was the same figure 
that she had given in her deposition. (R. 52) The 
testimony of a witness on his direct examination is 
no stronger than as modified or left by his further 
examination or cross-examination. (See Alvarado 
v. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986) 
Furthermore, the testimony that the speed was be-
tween 20 and 25 miles per hour can only support a 
finding of 20 miles per hour. (See Alvarado v. 
Tucker, supra.) 
The Plaintiff further testified that there was 
no other traffic in the vicinity. (R. 49) The Plaintiff 
further called as a witness Mrs. Singleton, a pas-
senger in the Plaintiff's car, who testified that the 
Defendant's truck started into the intersection be-
fore the Plaintiff had reached the intersection. (R 
63) These facts present two distinct problems for 
the court's consideration. First, whether or not the 
Plaintiff on the favored highway owed a duty in 
this particular case to observe what is happening 
to the vehicle on the disfavored highway, which she 
failed to discharge. This matter has heretofore been 
discussed by our Court in the cases of H-ickok v. 
Skinner, (1948), 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 514, and 
Conklin v. Walsh, (1948), 113 Utah 276, 193 P.2d 
437, which cases will be discussed in greater detail 
herein. The seeond proble1n presented. is whether 
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or not under these facts, the Defendant having once 
stopped for the stop sign and yielded the right of 
way to all vehicles in the immediate vicinity at the 
time of stopping at the stop sign then had the right 
of way and the Plaintiff o\ved a duty to yield the 
right of way by reason of U.C.A., 1953, Sees. 41-6-72 
and 41-6-74. 
In the case of Srnith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 
Pac. 893, we have a fact situation involving a city 
ordinance requiring the inviduals to stop at an ar-
terial or through highway and requiring the indi-
vidual to yield the right of way to vehicles approach-
ing from the left. That case involved an accident 
at Atkins Avenue and Highland Drive. There \vas 
a dispute in the evidence as to whether or not the 
Defendant had stopped at the stop sign. The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, and 
the Defendant appealed. This court revel·sed the 
jury's decision based upon certain of the instructions 
of the court. The court in discussing the law held: 
''If the respondent stopped immediately be-
fore entering Highland Drive, he complied with 
all the requirements of the ordinance. From that 
moment he was free to move without restriction, 
so far as the ordinance is concerned. As he ap-
proached Highland Drive after stopping, the 
statute gave him the right of way as against 
automobiles corning in the direction the respond-
ent was traveling, and made it the duty of such 
persons approaching from the left to yield the 
right of vvay. But these rights were only rela-
tive, and must be applied in the light of the con-
ditions existing at the time.'' 
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This then leads us, in the instant case, to the 
question, after the Defendant has complied with the 
statute by stopping and yielding the right of way 
which of the two vehicles entering the intersection 
from different highways, has the right of way. The 
statutory provision U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 41-6-72 (b) 
says: 
''When two vehicles enter an intersection 
from different highways and at the same time 
the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield 
the right of way to the vehicle on the right.'' 
Since in our principal case the Defendant's ve-
hicle was proceeding from the west and going east 
and the Plaintiff's vehicle was proceeding from 
the north and going south, the Plaintiff's vehicle 
would be the one on the left if the two vehicles en-
tered the intersection at the same time. 
An examination of the record to show which 
vehicle entered the intersection first shows by the 
testimony of J\1rs. Singleton, who was the only wit-
ness to the accident and saw the vehicles as they 
entered the intersection, that the Plaintiff had not 
entered the intersection when the Defendant's truck 
started to pull out. (R. 63) 
This then leads to the second inescapable con-
clusion that the Plaintiff was negligent in failing to 
yield the right of way since the Defendant had al-
ready entered the intersection from a different high-
way. The statutory provision of U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 
41-6-72 (a) states: 
''The driver of a Yehicle approaching an in-
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tersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle 
which has entered the intersection from a dif-
ferent highway.'' 
At the time J\tirs. Williams saw the Defendant's 
truck she testified she was 25 feet north of the inter-
section. (R. 50) She would then have besides the 
25 feet north of the intersection also the one-half 
of the width of the intersection there as a distance 
to travel before the impact. She also testified that 
she was traveling about 20 miles an hour (R. 51) at 
the time she saw the Defendant's vehicle. Thus tak-
ing the testimony of the Plaintiff in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, the Defendant had stopped 
and yielded to the vehicles in the immediate vicinity 
at the tilne that he stopped at the intersection. Al-
though the Defendant's driver was not called as a 
witness to testify the testimony of the Plaintiff 
would clearly indicate this. ~rhe fact that the Plain-
tiff was under a duty of care for her own safety 
even though she was traveling upon the favored 
highway is well established in the law. 
The case of Hickok v. Skinner, (1948), 113 Utah 
1, 190 P.2d 514, is a case which has been recognized 
by this court and has laid down the well establishe::l 
rule that regardless of which driver is technically 
entitled to the right of way, both drivers must exe-
cute due care and caution for their own safety in 
proceeding into and across intersections: 
"While the burden to drive so carefully as 
always to be prepared for, and to be able to avoid, 
the negligence of another should not be placed 
on either driver, there should be placed on both 
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the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use 
reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither 
should be permitted to close his eyes to other ve-
hicles which he knows or has reason to believe 
are approaching, simply beca.use a state statute 
or municipal ordinance designates him the pre-
ferred driver. The rights of drivers approaching 
and crossing intersections are relative. Both 
drivers have the duties of being heedful and of 
maintaining a proper lookout. Plaintiff was 
neglectful in both particulars, and no jury could 
reasonably find that he was not negligent.'' (Em-
phasis Added) 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Autornobile Law & 
Practice, Perm. Ed. Vol. 2, Section 1037 at page 354 
states the following : 
''A driver who attempts to cross an intersec-
tion looking directly ahead, without looking up 
intersecting streets for approaching vehicles, and 
collides with a vehicle approaching from such 
street, must be deemed guilty of negligence per 
se, if, had he looked before attempting to cross, 
he would have seen the colliding car coming a 
short distance away." 
Such is certainly the case here. Having observed 
the Defendant's vehicle stopped at a stop sign, the 
Plaintiff testified that she then looked straight 
ahead and failed ever again to look to the right to see 
what the Defendant's automobile was doing, and be-
fore Plaintiff entered the intersection, the Defend-
ant's automobile was entering the intersection ac-
cording to the testhnony of 1\Irs. Singleton the wit-
ness in the automobile heretofore referred to. 
1.0 
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The facts of the principal case clearly come with-
in the facts of the case of Conklin v. Walsh, supra. 
In that case the Defendant was traveling east on 
South Temple and the Plaintiff's automobile was 
coming south on '' 0'' Street. South Temple was 
the favored highway with stop signs protecting it at 
the intersection of '' 0'' Street. The important ques-
tion raised in this case is whether or not the Defend-
ant was negligent as a matter of law. Mrs. Conklin 
testified that she stopped at the stop sign approach-
ing South Temple. Defendant truck driver testified 
that he saw her approaching the stop sign but failed 
to see her stop. The court held : 
''The difficult question in this case is wheth-
er or not the record established that the driver 
of the Walsh truck was guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law. J.1f rs. Conklin's testimony that 
she stopped is uncontradicted. Walsh was trav-
eling an arterial highway at a fairly rapid rate 
of speed. He was some considerable distance 
west of the intersection when he saw the other 
car approaching from the side street controlled 
by a stop sign. He thereafter completely ignored 
the Conklin car and drove blindly ahead without 
again checking the position and movement of 
the other car until too late to avoid colliding W'ith 
it. The defendant truck driver was not justified 
in thus ignoring the movement of plaintiff's 
automobile. The duty to keep a proper lookout 
applies as well to the favored as to the disfavored 
driver. Neither driver can excuse his own fail-
ure to observe because the other driver failed in 
his duty. Neither driver is at any time to be ex-
cused for want of vigilance or failure to see what 
11 
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is plain to be seen. Drivers are permitted to 
cross over arterial highways after having 
stopped. True, they must yield the right of way 
to cars which are close enough to consitute an im-
mediate hazard. This rule, however, requires the 
exercise of some judgement. There is still a duty 
on the part of the driver traveling the arterial 
highway to remain reasonably alert to the pos-
sibility of the disfavored driver starting across 
the intersection in the belief that he can cross 
in safety. The duty of keeping a proper lookout 
attends all those operating motor vehicles, and 
other rules of the road do not relieve any driver 
of the necessity of complying with this require-
ment." (Emphasis Added) 
The trial court found in this case that the De-
fendant was negligent as a matter of law and this 
court on appeal affirmed that decision by saying: 
''The driver having failed to see Plaintiff's 
automobile until too late to aYoid the collision, 
we see no escape from the conclusion that he did 
not keep a proper lookout and was guilty of neg-
ligence in that omission. The trial court so 
held.'' 
The next case to reach this court is the case of 
Nielson v. Mauchlcy, (1949), 115 Utah 68, 202 P.2d 
547. In this case the Plaintiff \Yas traYeling along 
an icy road and failed to see a school bus backing 
out of a yard until too late to avoid the collision. 
The trial court held that there \Yas negligence as a 
matter of law and directed a Y<-•rdict of no cause of 
action, which this court reYersed because the ques-
tion of whether or not h<-• had been trayeling too 
12 
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fast and been able to avoid the collision were facts 
which should have been submitted to the jury. How-
ever, the court recognized and again reiterated the 
doctrine held in Hickok v. Skinner, supra, and Conk-
lin v. Walsh, supra. The court said: 
"The mere fact that Plaintiff had the right 
of way did not give him a right of proceed with-
out regard to existing conditions. He must ex-
ercise due care and act as a reasonably prudent 
man would act under all pre-existing curcum-
stances. '' 
Again we say to the court that in this particular 
case Mrs. Williams when 25 feet north of the inter-
section gave an utter disregard to the position of 
the Defendant herein and then proceeded blindly 
on into and through the intersection. 
The next case to consider the rights and liabil-
ities of the drivers at intersections is the case of 
Gren v. Norton (1949), 117 Utah 121, 213 P.2d 356. 
In this case the Plaintiff entered the intersection 
of 12th North and 5th West Street in Provo after 
apparently stopping for a stop sign on 12th North 
Street. The witnesses testified that the Plaintiff 
failed to observe the Defendant until shortly before 
the impact even though he had ample opportunity 
to do so. This court upon appeal held that the Plain-
tiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The 
court held: 
''As we held in the Hickok vs. Skinner case, 
supra, the fact that the statute gives a motorist 
a right-of-way into an intersection does not per-
mit him to proceed across without observing the 
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movement of other vehicles which may be mov-
ing into and across the intersection ... In this 
particular instance deceased was traveling at a 
slow rate of speed, should have seen the truck 
aproaching, and could have stopped his car in a 
very short . distance. He should not be charged 
with avoiding defendant's negligence but he is 
required to maintain a reasonable lookout for his 
own safety." 
The next case of this court to consider this point 
is the case of Spackman v. Carson, (1950), 117 Utah 
390, 216 P .2d 640. In this case the Defendant had 
a truck parked off from the highway and the Plain-
tiff traveling on a motorcycle failed to observ~ the 
Defendant truck as it proceeded onto the highway 
and going in the same direction and angled onto the 
highway. The appeal raised the issue whether or 
not the lower court erred in denying Defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict. The court in analyzing 
this case stated that it was a close case and observed 
that it was not a case of a vehicle parked off the high-
way under such circumstances as would ''give warn-
ing that the driver had moved off the pavement onto 
the shoulder of the road only momentarily and might 
at any moment 1nove back onto it as frequentl~T hap-
pens with the traveling public." Certainly in the 
instant case which we have before us now. the Plain-
tiff should have been a ware that the Defendant was 
in a position at any moment to 1nove forward into 
the intersection since he had already stopped for the 
stop sign. 
The court goes on to refer to the case of Conklin 
v. lValsh, supra, and distinguishes the two cases by 
14 
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saying: 
''Clearly, that case has no application here 
because there, unlike the instant case, the vehic-
les which moved onto the arterial highway was 
about to enter the arterial highway when first ob-
served by the driver of the vehicle on the arterial 
highway and hence the latter was alerted to the 
possibility that the right of way might not be 
yielded to him.'' 
Certainly in the instant case that application of 
the Conklin-Walsh doctrine is clearly applicable. 
The Plaintiff should have been alerted to the fact 
that the Defendant at any moment was about to move 
into the intersection, and yet in utter disregard of 
the Defendant's position the Plaintiff continued on 
without even looking to the Defendant's truck. The 
Plaintiff obviously had the duty to see what was 
there to be seen (Mingus v. Olsson, (1949) 114 Utah 
505, 201 P.2d 495) and had the Plaintiff observed 
the Defendant's movements before entering the inter-
section the Plaintiff would have observed that the 
Defendant had started forward and was entering 
the intersection. (R. 63) This is the testimony of 
Mrs. Singleton, the eye witness. 
The next case to consider this particular point 
of intersection accidents is the case of Poulsen v. 
Nlanness, (1952) 121 Utah 269, 241 P.2d 152. This 
case involves the intersection of two country roads 
with no stop signs at the intersection. The court held 
that the right of way between the two cars was a 
matter for the jury. Justice Wolfe in his concurring 
opinion made the observation that this case differs 
lf> 
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from the usual circumstances of city intersections as 
against the intersections out in the country. Cer-
tainly a greater degree of care is required of a driver 
on traveling the city streets where the traffic is much 
more congested and cars are traversing intersections 
at frequent intervals. 
In the case of Martin v. Stevens, (1952) 121 Utah 
484, 243 P.2d 747, we have an intersection case in-
volving 18th East and Stratford Avenue in Salt Lake 
City. In that case there were no traffic signals or 
signs controlling traffic at the intersection. The 
matter of the negligence of the Plaintiff was dis-
cussed in the case but the testimony shows that the 
Plaintiff failed to see the Defendant's automobile 
until too late to avoid the accident. The court again 
reviewed the Conklin v. Walsh doctrine and the other 
cases in support thereof and made this observation: 
''In order to avoid burdening this opinion 
with a repetition and analysis of each of these 
cases, one principal which distinguishes them 
from the case at bar can be suc~-inctly stated: 
Each of them was decided upon the proposition 
that the circurnstances were such that the driver 
held to be negligent as a matter of la1t', either 
observed, or in the c.ce rcise of due care should 
have obserrcd, the manner in which the other 
driver was approaching the -intersection and 
clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have 
avo1:ded the coll-1:sion. Or to state it in other 
words, the negligence, or manner of dri'viug, of 
the other driver teas such tl1at the drit·er apprais-
ing tl1 f situation 1t'as al f rtfd to it or by using dtte 
care 1conld have been so alerted hz time so that 
16 
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by the exercise of ordinary precaution he could 
have avoided the collision. And, in each of these 
cases, this seemed to the court so clearly mani-
fest that reasonable minds could not find to the 
contrary.'' (Emphasis Added) 
The latest case the writer is able to find involv-
ing an intersection accident and discussed by this 
court is the case of Bates v. Burns, et al, (1956) 3 
Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209. In this case the Plain-
tiff's vehicle had been the one to stop at a stop sign 
and then had proceeded into the intersection. There 
was considerable conflict in the testimony as to the 
respective distances and speeds of the two vehicles. 
As the Plaintiff entered the intersection he \Vaf, 
looking for traffic approaching from the west. This 
would be the direction from which the traffic would 
be coming as he crossed the first half of the highway. 
l-Ie then looked for the traffic coming from the east 
as he was approaching the center of the highway. 
This court in discussing this evidence and construing 
the law said that it would be a jury question, but 
again recognized that a person on a favored high-
way has the duty to observe all conditions for his 
own safety and affirmed the doctrine of the Conklin 
v. Walsh case. Certainly in the principal case the 
Plaintiff failed to observe the Defendant's vehicle 
which was stopped on her right side and the posi-
tion of nearest approach to the intersection. This 
was true even after she observed that there was no 
traffic coming from the left and approaching the 
intersection. 
The case of Hundley v. United States (1955) 
131 F. Supp. 655 involves an intersection accident 
17 
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between an army vehicle which had stopped for a 
stop sign and a motorist traveling about 15 miles 
per hour on a favored highway. Because of the ice-
fog condition, the motorist's visibility was limited 
to 30 feet and in this case the court found that the 
motorist was guiltJ of contributorily negligence in 
failing to keep a proper lookout and in assuming 
that the vehicle which had stopped for the stop sign 
would remain at the stop sign. Obviously these facts 
are applicable to the instant case because the Plain-
tiff assumed that the Defendant would remain 
stopped at the stop sign and failed to give heed to 
his position any more than that. 
CONCLUSION 
The result in this case should be the affirma-
tion of the lower courts ruling that the Plaintiff, 
Mrs. Ida Williams, was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law, which negligence proxin1ately con-
tributed to or caused the accident herein since she 
failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent 
person under like or similar circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NIELSE~- .A~D CONDER 
.ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
18 
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